Samuel Moyn’s Reconstruction of Critical Legal Studies: Political Economy and Intersectional Subordination

I. Introduction

Samuel Moyn, Chancellor Kent Professor of Law at Yale Law School, published Reconstructing Critical Legal Studies in the Yale Law Journal in 2024. The essay argues that it is a good moment to build a new radical theory of law, and that the critical legal studies (CLS) movement of the 1970s and 1980s, though it collapsed decades ago, still offers the best starting point for that project. Moyn's central claim is that CLS's most important and most misunderstood contribution was to refuse a choice between two extremes. One extreme treats law as simply an instrument of economic or social domination, fully determined by outside forces. The other extreme treats law as radically indeterminate, so flexible that it can be read to mean almost anything. Moyn insists that a credible radical theory of law must hold both insights together: law is deeply implicated in institutionalising and legitimating oppression, but it does so through processes that are underdetermined, meaning that the same social function can be achieved by many different legal routes, and legal texts can be read in more than one way without being infinitely malleable. The real mistake, Moyn writes, is not choosing false necessity over freedom, or freedom over necessity; the mistake is treating the two as a false dichotomy that must be resolved one way or the other.

The essay is organised in four parts. Part I sketches the broader tradition of social theory that CLS radicalised. Part II reconstructs the internal debate inside CLS itself, contrasting Morton Horwitz's crude economic functionalism, Duncan Kennedy's turn toward the indeterminacy of legal consciousness, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger's attempt to hold the middle ground between the two. Part III, which is the subject of this paper, turns to the present. It asks whether three of today's leading progressive movements in legal scholarship, namely the Law and Political Economy (LPE) movement, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory (CRT), have learned the lesson that CLS's internal history teaches, or whether they have quietly abandoned the search for balance in favour of one-sided functionalism. Part IV then extends the same question to Marxist legal theory.

This paper examines Part III of Moyn's essay in detail, covering pages 108 to 116. It proceeds in three main sections, corresponding to Moyn's own three subsections: the Law and Political Economy movement, feminist legal theory as represented by Catharine MacKinnon, and critical race theory as represented by Derrick Bell. A fourth section draws together Moyn's diagnosis of all three movements and explains how it connects to the larger argument of the essay. The paper closes with a short conclusion on what Moyn's critique means for the future of radical legal theory.

II. The Law and Political Economy Movement and Intersectional Subordination

2.1 Emergence of LPE

Moyn explains that progressive legal scholarship changed significantly after the 2007–08 financial crisis, with political economy becoming an important basis for analysing law. Scholars increasingly studied how economic structures interact with patriarchy, racism, colonialism, heteronormativity, and ableism.

The Law and Political-Economy (LPE) movement emerged as a major institutional expression of this shift. Moyn views LPE positively because it revived progressive legal scholarship and challenged the dominance of law and economics.

While law and economics often treats markets as relatively natural or neutral, LPE argues that markets are legally and politically constructed. Property, contracts, labour, corporations, and markets depend on legal rules determining ownership, bargaining power, enforcement, distribution of economic power, and remedies.

2.2 Denaturalising the Economy

LPE's central contribution is to “denaturalise the economy.” This means showing that economic arrangements that appear natural or inevitable are actually the products of legal and political choices.

Thus, LPE asks:

• Who receives property rights?
• What does ownership legally mean?
• How are contracts enforced?
• Who possesses bargaining power?
• How are labour relations regulated?
• What legal rules structure markets?
• How does law distribute economic power?

This continues the insight of legal realism, especially Robert Hale, that private law can distribute coercive power between individuals. Moyn appreciates this critique of the idea that the economy exists independently of law, but argues that denaturalising the economy alone does not explain how law actually operates within economic structures.

2.3 The Problem of Functionalism

Moyn's main criticism of early LPE is that it can become functionalist. Functionalism asks what function a legal rule performs within a particular social or economic system. For example, contract law may be understood as performing the function of facilitating market exchange.

The problem occurs when the argument becomes:

Capitalism requires a particular function → therefore law must take a particular form.

Moyn considers this too simple because the same social or economic function can be achieved through different legal arrangements.

2.4 Functional Underdeterminacy

Functional underdeterminacy means that a particular social or economic function does not determine one specific legal form.

For example, capitalism may require protection of property and enforcement of agreements, but different capitalist societies can organise property and contract law differently.

Thus: Capitalism constrains law, but does not completely determine its precise legal form. This matters because if economic interests directly determined law, legal development would be easy to explain: economic conditions change, and law simply follows. In reality, different legal arrangements can serve similar economic functions, and legal development cannot always be explained solely by reference to economic structures.

2.5 Vulgar Marxism and the Need for a Complete Theory

Moyn connects excessive functionalism with “vulgar Marxism,” where the economic base is treated as determining the legal and political superstructure. Law then appears mainly as a reflection or instrument of economic interests. Moyn does not reject the connection between law and political economy. Instead, he argues that LPE needs a more sophisticated explanation of the relationship between:

Social structures → legal institutions → legal interpretation → particular outcomes

Thus, the question is not merely:“Whose economic interests does this law serve?” It is also: “How does this particular legal outcome emerge within a social structure that permits several possible legal arrangements?”

2.6 Interpretive Underdeterminacy

The second key concept is interpretive underdeterminacy. Legal rules do not always have one fixed meaning that automatically determines an outcome. Courts, lawyers, administrators, and other legal actors interpret and apply them.

For ex, A constitutional equality provision may support broad or narrow interpretations. Its language constrains interpretation but does not necessarily dictate one result.

So, Law is neither completely determined nor completely free. Social and political conditions influence legal interpretation, but they do not eliminate all alternatives. Consequently, saying that “law supports neoliberalism” is insufficient. A stronger analysis must explain how neoliberal outcomes repeatedly emerge through particular legal disputes, interpretations, and institutional decisions.

2.7 Intersectional Political Economy

A major strength of LPE is its intersectional understanding of domination.

It does not treat class or economic domination as the only form of inequality. It recognises interaction among:

• class and economic power
• race and racialisation
• gender and patriarchy
• colonialism
• heteronormativity
• ableism

Economic structures affect people differently depending on their position within racial, gender, and other hierarchies. Likewise, racial and gender inequalities can themselves be reinforced by economic institutions. Thus LPE rejects the idea that there is one single “master” form of domination.

2.9 Intersectionality Does Not Solve the Theoretical Problem

Although Moyn values LPE's intersectional approach, he argues that identifying multiple forms of domination does not by itself explain how law reproduces them.

Two questions must be distinguished:

1. What forms of domination exist and how do they interact?
2. How does law operate within those structures and reproduce or change them?

The first concerns the substance and structure of domination. The second concerns the operation and causal role of law. Simply showing that capitalism, patriarchy, racism, and colonialism interact does not explain why a particular legal interpretation or outcome emerges. This leads Moyn to examine feminist legal theory and critical race theory, asking whether their focus on particular forms of domination sufficiently addresses the problem of determinacy and underdeterminacy.

2.10 Moyn's Central Argument

Moyn's central claim is: Law is deeply shaped by economic and social structures, but those structures do not mechanically determine every legal outcome. He rejects two extremes:

1. Complete determinacy

Capitalism, patriarchy, racism or another social structure directly determines what law must be.

2. Complete indeterminacy

Law is essentially independent of social structures and almost any outcome is equally possible.

Moyn's position lies between these extremes: Social structures constrain law, but legal rules and interpretations retain some flexibility. This is why functional underdeterminacy and interpretive underdeterminacy are central to his reconstruction of CLS.

They explain simultaneously that:

• law can help reproduce capitalism, patriarchy, racial hierarchy, and other forms of domination; and
• law is not completely predetermined, because alternative interpretations and institutional choices remain possible.

Moyn appreciates LPE for reconnecting law with political economy and recognising intersectional domination, but argues that a genuinely critical legal theory must go further by explaining how social structures constrain law, how particular legal interpretations become dominant, why different legal outcomes remain possible and how alternative interpretations can emerge. This theoretical problem leads to Moyn's subsequent examination of feminist legal theory and critical race theory.

III. Feminist Legal Theory: Catharine MacKinnon

3.1 MacKinnon's Feminist Theory and Marxist Foundation

Moyn examines Catharine MacKinnon because she developed a more explicit theory of both social domination and law than early LPE. MacKinnon borrowed the structure of Marxism, but replaced class domination with sexual domination. Instead of treating economic class as the central form of oppression, she placed gender, sexuality, and patriarchy at the centre.

Her key claim is:

“Sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality.”[1]

Thus:

Sexual domination → gender inequality → broader social relations

For MacKinnon, patriarchy is an independent system of domination, not merely a consequence of economic inequality.

3.2 Sexual Domination as the Basis of Social Order

MacKinnon adapted Marxist analysis as follows:

Gender is not simply a natural difference. It is socially constructed through relations of power. Moyn values MacKinnon for developing a complete theory of patriarchy rather than treating gender inequality merely as an effect of economic organisation.

3.3 Moyn's Appreciation of MacKinnon

Moyn agrees with MacKinnon's important insight that gender cannot be properly understood without analysing sexual domination. He even suggests that gender may provide a stronger foundation for social theory than capitalism or race because gender hierarchy has appeared in some form across known human societies, whereas capitalism is historically specific and racial categories have varied considerably. Thus, Patriarchy cannot be adequately understood without placing sexual domination at the centre of analysis.

3.4 The Historical Problem

Moyn nevertheless identifies a weakness. If sexual domination exists across virtually all societies, MacKinnon's theory has difficulty explaining historical change.

It struggles to explain:

• why patriarchy differs between societies;
• why gender relations change over time;
• why laws concerning women change;
• why some forms of sexual domination weaken while others emerge; and
• how different economic and political systems affect gender relations.

Unlike Marxism, which explains historical change through changing modes of production, MacKinnon's theory can make sexual domination appear too constant and universal.

3.5 From Functionalism to “Vulgar Feminism” [2]

This leads to Moyn's central criticism. MacKinnon's theory can become functionalist, treating institutions according to the function they perform for male domination. He said Vulgar Marxism was the social theory she both copied and replaced with a “vulgar” feminism.

Moyn calls this “vulgar feminism,” drawing an analogy with “vulgar Marxism.”

• Vulgar Marxism: economic structure → determines law
• Vulgar feminism: sexual domination → determines law

Thus, MacKinnon changes the determining force from class/economics to sexual domination, but Moyn believes the underlying problem of excessive determinacy remains. The problem is not recognising patriarchy. The problem is treating patriarchy as if it determines legal outcomes and leaving insufficient room for competing interests, legal flexibility, and alternative interpretations.

3.6 Law as an Instrument of Sexual Domination

For MacKinnon, law can operate as an instrument and ideology of sexual domination. The analogy is:

Marxism:
Economic base → legal/political superstructure

MacKinnon:
Sexual domination → social institutions and law

This has considerable explanatory power because law has historically regulated sexuality, marriage, family, employment, reproduction and women's status, reinforcing gender hierarchy. But, Moyn asks whether this is sufficient.

If law simply reproduces male domination, it becomes difficult to explain:

• why legal rules sometimes produce unexpected outcomes;
• why courts disagree;
• why laws change; and
• why legal institutions can become sites of contestation.

This returns to the problem of underdeterminacy.

3.7 MacKinnon's Criticism of CLS

MacKinnon disagreed with the CLS focus on legal indeterminacy, mainly the idea associated with Duncan Kennedy that legal rules and rights can support competing interpretations. Her concern was practical: for people experiencing patriarchy, law can appear “all too determinate.” Women experiencing discrimination may encounter concrete and predictable legal disadvantages rather than a system of unlimited interpretive possibilities. Moyn understands this criticism, but believes MacKinnon may have gone too far in the opposite direction by underestimating legal flexibility.

3.8 The Problem of Determinacy

Moyn argues that even if law historically supports patriarchy, it does not follow that every legal rule or interpretation must produce the same patriarchal result.

Legal systems contain:

• competing principles;
• different institutions;
• alternative interpretations;
• legislative reform; and
• opportunities for lawyers and social movements to challenge existing rules.

So, patriarchal structures constrain law but do not necessarily determine one unavoidable outcome. The important question is not merely: Does law reproduce patriarchy? It is: How, under what conditions and through which legal interpretations does law reproduce or challenge patriarchy?

This is interpretive underdeterminacy.

3.9 MacKinnon and Two Tendencies within CLS

Moyn identifies two tendencies within CLS:

1. Crude functionalism, associated especially with Morton Horwitz, which explains law mainly through social and economic interests.
2. A more balanced approach, associated with Roberto Mangabeira Unger, which recognises both social constraints and the flexibility or underdeterminacy of law.

Moyn believes MacKinnon largely follows the first tendency. She successfully explains law's relationship with social domination but does not sufficiently account for the autonomy, flexibility, and interpretive openness of legal institutions. Thus, Her theory becomes too one-directional.

3.10 Moyn's Overall Assessment

Moyn's assessment of MacKinnon is both appreciative and critical.

What Moyn values:

• She places sexual domination and patriarchy at the centre of analysis.
• She shows that gender inequality cannot be reduced to economic inequality.
• She provides a powerful theory of how social institutions can reproduce patriarchy.

Moyn's criticism:

• Her theory becomes excessively functionalist.
• Sexual domination risks being treated as the force that determines legal outcomes.
• It does not sufficiently explain legal variation, interpretation, contestation, and change.

The central problem is: MacKinnon explains why law can reproduce patriarchy, but Moyn asks why law takes one particular form rather than another.

Moyn's preferred balance

IV. Critical Race Theory: Derrick Bell

4.1 Derrick Bell and the Emergence of CRT [3]

Moyn presents Derrick Bell as a foundational figure in Critical Race Theory (CRT). Bell challenged the belief that formal equality and legal reform would gradually eliminate racial inequality. He argued that apparently neutral legal rules can continue to reproduce racial hierarchy. Even when openly discriminatory laws disappear, racial domination can take new institutional and legal forms.

Thus, Bell rejects:

Legal reform → racial equality → disappearance of racial hierarchy

Moyn describes this continuing tendency as a “racializing tilt” in law.

4.2 Racial Realism and Pessimism

Bell developed racial realism, associated with a broader racial pessimism/Afro-pessimism[4]. His argument was that racism is deeply embedded in American social and legal structures and cannot simply be eliminated through formal legal reform. His famous pessimistic claim was:

“Black people will never gain full equality in this country.” [5]

Bell's historical analysis appeared to support this pessimism because racial inequality repeatedly survived reforms intended to eliminate it. He says Formal legal equality does not necessarily produce substantive racial equality. The important question is not only what a law says, but what the legal system actually does to racial relations.

4.3 Civil-Rights Litigation

Bell examined school-desegregation litigation [6] and questioned whether civil-rights lawyers' goals always matched the interests of Black communities.

Desegregation could produce:

• white resistance
• white flight
• institutional backlash and
• limited benefits for Black children.

Bell did not argue that litigation was useless. Rather, he warned that legal victories should not automatically be equated with social transformation.

Milliken v. Bradleyand Desegregation

Moyn uses Milliken v. Bradley,[7] to illustrate the limits of desegregation. The case showed how residential segregation and school-district boundaries could limit meaningful integration. It demonstrated that constitutional equality did not automatically produce racial equality. For Bell, this showed that the legal system could formally maintain equality while legal doctrine and institutional decisions continued to produce outcomes compatible with racial hierarchy.

4.4 Interest-Convergence Thesis [8]

Bell's famous interest-convergence thesis argues that racial progress is more likely when Black interests converge with the interests of powerful white groups.

Black interests + dominant-group interests → greater possibility of legal reform

Thus, racial reform may occur not simply because racial injustice is morally recognised, but because dominant groups also gain political, economic, social, or international advantages from reform. Thus, Bell questioned purely moral explanations of decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education.

4.5 Elites, Co-optation and Formal Progress [9]

Bell also examined cooperation between Black and white elites. A reform may benefit Black elites while simultaneously serving the interests of dominant white groups. So, apparent racial progress does not necessarily mean that racial power structures have fundamentally changed.

Formal racial progress ≠ transformation of racial power.

4.6 Bell's Major Strength

Bell's major contribution was showing that racial domination can reinvent itself. (Reinvented subordination)

Old racial hierarchy → legal reform → new legal/institutional arrangement → continuing racial inequality

Moyn accepts that Bell's pessimism was supported by historical events. But, being proven right by history does not mean that his theory fully explains why those events happened. Bell may correctly describe what happened without fully explaining why and how it happened.

4.7 Moyn's Theoretical Criticism

Moyn's main criticism is similar to his criticism of MacKinnon. If racial domination repeatedly reproduces itself, Bell must explain the legal mechanism of that reproduction. Simply saying that white supremacy persists is insufficient because:

• legal rules can have different interpretations;
• institutions can produce different outcomes; and
• constitutional principles can be applied differently over time.

So, Moyn asks If law can produce different outcomes, why does one interpretation repeatedly become compatible with racial domination? This is the problem of functional and interpretive underdeterminacy.

4.8 Moyn's Overall Assessment

Moyn largely admires Bell for focusing that formal legal equality does not necessarily eliminate racial hierarchy. Racial realism and interest convergence provide powerful explanations of the limits of civil-rights reform. But, Bell risks excessive determinacy if racial domination is treated as inevitably determining legal outcomes. All radicals are in the same boat.

The parallel is:

• MacKinnon: sexual domination → law
• Bell: racial domination → law

Moyn instead prefers: Social structures constrain law, but do not completely determine its form or interpretation. This also connects to intersectionality. Following Kimberlé Crenshaw,[10] different forms of domination should not simply be added together. Their interaction can produce distinct forms of subordination. Bell shows that racial hierarchy can reproduce itself through law, but Moyn argues that this reproduction is not automatic. It occurs through changing legal institutions, interpretations, and arrangements.

So, a critical legal theory must explain both:

1. why domination persists, and
2. why law remains sufficiently underdetermined to permit resistance, alternative interpretations and legal change.

V. Moyn's Synthesis and the Unfinished Theoretical Task

Moyn's discussion of Law and Political Economy (LPE), feminist legal theory and Critical Race Theory (CRT) makes one central point. He does not reject these approaches. Instead, he argues that they have identified important forms of domination but have not fully explained how law reproduces those forms of domination. The main problem is the relationship between social structures and law. Moyn believes that the best part of Critical Legal Studies was its attempt to avoid two extremes.

On one side, crude functionalism treats law as simply reflecting or serving existing social and economic interests. On the other side, excessive emphasis on legal indeterminacy can make law appear almost completely free from social constraints.

Moyn prefers a middle position, associated particularly with Roberto Mangabeira Unger.

This position recognises four ideas:

1. Functional determinacy: law can perform important social functions and can reproduce existing forms of domination.
2. Functional underdeterminacy: the same social function can be achieved through different legal arrangements.
3. Interpretive determinacy: legal texts and principles place limits on what can reasonably be argued.
4. Interpretive underdeterminacy: the same legal materials can sometimes support more than one reasonable interpretation.

So, law is neither completely determined nor completely free.

This explains the problems Moyn identifies in the three approaches discussed in Part III. LPE correctly shows that law shapes economic organisation, but needs to explain why a particular economic arrangement becomes legally dominant rather than another. MacKinnon correctly identifies sexual domination and patriarchy, but risks treating law as a direct instrument of male domination. Bell correctly shows how racial hierarchy can survive legal reform, but needs to explain more precisely how legally open provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause, are repeatedly interpreted in ways compatible with racial inequality.

Moyn distinguishes between identifying domination and explaining its legal reproduction. Showing that capitalism, patriarchy, or racism exists is not enough for a complete legal theory. The theory must also explain how legal rules, institutions, and interpretations help reproduce these structures.

Moyn also accepts the importance of intersectionality. Economic, racial, and gender domination can interact and create forms of subordination that cannot be understood by looking at only one category. However, simply combining different forms of domination does not solve the deeper theoretical problem. The question remains: how does law translate these social structures into particular legal outcomes?

This is why Moyn considers the theoretical task unfinished. Contemporary radical legal theories have successfully brought questions of capitalism, race, gender and inequality back into legal scholarship, but they still need a stronger theory of law itself.

Key Terms in Moyn's Part III

1. Law and Political Economy (LPE) Movement
   A legal approach that studies how law, markets, economic power, and political power are connected. It argues that economic arrangements are not purely natural but are shaped by legal and political choices.
2. Denaturalising the Economy
   The idea that the economy and markets are not natural or neutral systems. They are created and organised through law and political decisions.
   Simple: The market is made by law; it does not simply exist independently of law.
3. Functionalism
   Understanding law by asking what social or economic function it performs.
   Example: Contract law helps make economic transactions possible.
4. Functional Underdeterminacy
   The idea that one social or economic function can be achieved through different legal arrangements.
   Example: Different countries can protect property rights in different ways while still having a capitalist economy.
5. Vulgar Marxism
   A simplified form of Marxist thinking in which economic interests or class relations are treated as directly determining law and politics.
   Simple: Economy determines law in a straightforward way.
6. Interpretive Underdeterminacy
   The idea that a legal rule or text can sometimes have more than one reasonable interpretation.
   Example: The same constitutional equality provision may be interpreted narrowly or broadly.
7. Vulgar Feminism
   Moyn's critical term for an overly simple version of feminist legal theory in which male domination is treated as directly determining social institutions and law.
   Simple: Law is seen mainly as an instrument of patriarchy.
8. Racial Realism
   Derrick Bell's approach arguing that racial inequality is deeply embedded in American society and law and cannot be eliminated simply through formal legal reform.
   Simple: Legal equality does not automatically produce racial equality.
9. Racial Pessimism / Afro-Pessimism
   The view that racial domination, particularly white supremacy, is extremely persistent and may never be completely eliminated.
   Bell's position is associated with this idea.
10. Interest-Convergence Thesis
    Bell's argument that racial progress is more likely when the interests of Black people converge with the interests of dominant white groups.
    Simple: Reform is more likely when it benefits both the oppressed and the powerful.
11. Co-optation
    The process by which members or leaders of a subordinated group are brought into cooperation with dominant groups, often in ways that protect existing power structures.
    Example: A small number of minority leaders may gain benefits while broader inequality remains.
12. Intersectional Subordination
    A form of disadvantage produced by the interaction of different forms of domination, such as race, gender, and class.
    Simple: Different forms of inequality can combine to create a distinct form of disadvantage.
13. Intersectionality
    The idea, associated particularly with Kimberlé Crenshaw, that race, gender, and other forms of disadvantage can interact rather than operate separately.
    Simple: A person may experience discrimination because of the combination of race and gender, not merely because of either one alone.
14. Functional Determinacy
    The idea that law really can perform particular social functions and reproduce existing social structures.
    Simple: Law can genuinely help maintain a particular social order.
15. Interpretive Determinacy
    The idea that legal texts and principles place limits on interpretation. Not every interpretation of a legal rule is equally reasonable.
    Simple: Law does not mean absolutely anything.

The two most important terms:
Functional underdeterminacy = different legal arrangements can perform the same social function.
Interpretive underdeterminacy = the same legal material can support different reasonable interpretations.

Together, they explain Moyn's central point: social structures influence and constrain law, but they do not completely determine legal outcomes.

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[1] Coined by legal scholar and radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon in 1982, the statement “sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality” argues that society constructs gender through the sexual erotization of dominance (male) and submission (female). In this view, sexuality is not merely a personal expression, but a core mechanism of power that keeps women subordinate. In this view, sexuality is not merely a personal expression, but a core mechanism of power that keeps women subordinate

[2] Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Juris

prudence, 8 Signs 635, 635-40 (1983).

[3] Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363, 369 (1992).

[4] Racial pessimism is a critical framework and viewpoint holding that anti-blackness and structural racism are permanent, unavoidable, and deeply embedded features of modern human civilization. Often closely tied to Afropessimism, it argues that social justice struggles and legal reforms cannot fully dismantle a system built on the foundational violence of chattel slavery

[5] Derrick Bell, Faces in the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism 12 (1992) (“Black people will never gain full equality in this country.”).

[6] School-desegregation litigation involves legal cases aimed at ending racial separation in public schools. The most famous case is Brown v. Board of Education (1954), where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that separate schools are not equal. This type of law action changed public education and still shapes school rules today

[7] 418 U.S. 717 (1974)

[8]  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 518-33 (1980).

[9] Derrick Bell, Faces in the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism 12 (1992) (“Black people will never gain full equality in this country.”)

[10] Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrim

ination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 139-40